Today in History
November 21, 1963: The Last Day Before
The last full day of John Kennedy’s life. A casualty report, a withdrawal memo already on file, and a second memo signed four days after he died.
Author nameLive Historic16 min readLast updated
On November 21, 1963, the day before he was assassinated, John Kennedy reviewed the latest casualty report from Vietnam, seventy three American dead in total, and remarked to his deputy press secretary Malcolm Kilduff: “After I come back from Texas, that’s going to change. There’s no reason for us to lose another man over there. Vietnam is not worth another American life.”
After I come back from Texas, that’s going to change. There’s no reason for us to lose another man over there. Vietnam is not worth another American life.
President Kennedy to Deputy Press Secretary Malcolm Kilduff, November 21, 1963.
Source pending. Replace this line with the citation for the casualty count and the quotation.
But that’s just the tip of the iceBERG.
What follows is not a theory of the murder. It is what the paper trail shows about the week of November 22, 1963, who was in the room for the decisions that came before and after it, and what those men had spent years saying in public. We did not have the word neocon yet. We had the men, and we have their memos.
Some key players
What the country was being told about Vietnam in November 1963 depended on who was doing the arguing. These are the officials whose names are on the arguments.
DossierWalt Rostow
Economist. Policy Planning. National Security Advisor to Lyndon Johnson, 1966–1969.
Economist, MIT and Yale, chief of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff under Kennedy, then deputy to McGeorge Bundy, then National Security Advisor to Lyndon Johnson from 1966 to 1969. Within weeks of Kennedy’s inauguration, Rostow circulated a memorandum recommending the commitment of eight to ten thousand American troops to South Vietnam. He was the principal author of the case for sustained bombing that became Operation Rolling Thunder in March 1965, which earned him the nickname “America’s Rasputin” and, in the obituaries, “architect of the Vietnam War.”
His commitments were not hidden. He wrote about them and argued them in office, and the men who worked beside him noticed. William H. Gleysteen Jr., who served on the National Security Council staff and later as Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs, said of him: “My most uncomfortable moments were during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. National Security Advisor Walt Rostow sounded like Netanyahu does today.”
Dossier · HingeEugene Rostow
Dean of Yale Law School. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
Walt’s younger brother. Dean of Yale Law School, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
In November 1963, in the days immediately following the assassination, it was Eugene Rostow who argued publicly for a commission of distinguished citizens rather than a congressional inquiry or a Texas prosecution, and who pressed for the inclusion of Allen Dulles, the CIA director Kennedy had fired, on that commission. Dulles took the seat. The body that resulted, the Warren Commission, produced the finding that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.
As Under Secretary, Eugene Rostow was a key American diplomat during June 1967, when Israel took the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the Golan. He supported UN Security Council Resolution 242, whose language on refugees has been read ever since as foreclosing the Palestinian right of return that Resolution 194 had affirmed.8 7 In 1976 he delivered a symposium on the British Mandate and the 1948 war without a single mention of the Palestinian Arabs or their exodus. In 1978, speaking to Congress, he said: “Our government argues that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal. I believe our government is wrong on this issue.” He was furious at Jimmy Carter that year for pressing Menachem Begin on settlements.
Author’s assessment
He is the hinge of this story, because he connects the war to the investigation. Eugene Rostow’s career touches the war, the 1967 settlement question, and the composition of the commission that investigated his president’s murder. If you want one official whose record runs through all three, he is the one.
DossierEarl Warren
Attorney General and Governor of California. Chief Justice. Chairman of the commission that bore his name.
He had been Eugene Rostow’s student at Yale Law School.
As Attorney General, Warren gave influential testimony before Congress in February 1942 in support of the forced removal of some 120,000 Japanese Americans, helping persuade the legislature that it was necessary. As governor he initially opposed their return.
Author’s assessment
Warren was rewarded with the Chief Justiceship. From that seat he presided over Brown v. Board and the reapportionment decisions, the case law that remade American constitutional order in the 1950s and 1960s, and then over the investigation of the murder of the president who had appointed him.
DossierBendetsen, Bazelon, and the property
The removal order, and the office that disposed of what the removed had owned.
The mechanics of the removal were drafted by Karl Bendetsen, the Army officer who wrote the executive order and who later fought reparations. The disposal of the property they left behind ran through the Alien Property Custodian’s office and its parallel in the Justice Department, where David Bazelon, later the youngest judge ever appointed to the D.C. Circuit, handled alien property litigation. Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt’s Interior Secretary, wrote that the conduct of that office deserved a Senate inquiry.
Two memos
On October 11, 1963, the White House issued National Security Action Memorandum 263 over McGeorge Bundy’s signature.1 Kennedy had reviewed the McNamara-Taylor report on October 5. The memorandum, in full:
NSAM 263
October 111963
At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.
The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.
After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved an instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.
NSAM 273
November 261963
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.
7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:
- Resulting damage to North Vietnam;
- The plausibility of denial;
- Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;
- Other international reaction.
Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.
46 days separate the two signed dates. Four days separate November 22 and the signature on November 26.
The Office of the Historian prints both texts.1 2 Its note on NSAM 273 says McGeorge Bundy wrote the first draft, that the draft was almost identical to the paper as signed, and that the major exception was paragraph 7. The draft paragraph 7, as the footnote quotes it, called for “a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity.” The signed paragraph 7, quoted above, asks for plans that estimate “resulting damage to North Vietnam.” Bundy thought President Kennedy and Ambassador Lodge might want to discuss the paper at a meeting planned for November 24.2
The manuscript dates that draft November 21, 1963. The printed footnote does not. It places the draft in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, and it does not put a date on the page.
Paragraph 2 of the signed memorandum does not cancel a withdrawal. It says the withdrawal objectives “remain as stated” in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.2 3 The dates are the argument. Read the two texts side by side.
Recall that Walt Rostow had argued for troops in 1961, that his brother joined the administration and defended the war in public and in international law, and that after Johnson left office Henry Kissinger took the National Security Advisor’s chair and kept pressing the same fight.
The money
Look at the budget. Department of Defense budget authority stood at $49.6 billion in FY1963 and $49.1 billion in FY1965. It was $63.6 billion in FY1966, $76.3 billion in FY1968, $85.7 billion by FY1975.4
Author’s assessment
That escalation is what made possible everything that followed. Israel has never won a war against its neighbors on its own strength. It has won because American strength was there to be drawn upon, and American strength in the 1960s and 1970s was a direct product of the Vietnam buildup. The pattern did not end with Vietnam. The war on terror, which has cost the United States more than eight trillion dollars by the Watson Institute’s accounting, extended the same arrangement by another half century.5 American munitions and high-end weaponry are today being drawn down again, for someone else’s war.
October 1973
While American eyes were fixed on Vietnam, year after year, the Middle East moved without much American scrutiny. In June 1967 Israel launched a war and tripled its territory, while Washington was consumed with the Gulf of Tonkin and the Tet offensive still to come. In October 1973, with its forces collapsing, the Israeli leadership met in Golda Meir’s office, resolved to arm its nuclear arsenal for use if the fronts gave way, and informed Washington of the decision. Seymour Hersh documented the October 8 meeting in The Samson Option.6 The United States responded with Operation Nickel Grass, the largest emergency military resupply in its history to that point.
Author’s assessment
The airlift was possible because the Vietnam buildup had created an American military industrial base large enough to do it. America did not blink. It was busy with the Communists.
Conclusion
- 01
JFK had been dragging his feet on Vietnam for years. By September and October 1963 he had signed a drawdown and a withdrawal schedule. LBJ reversed the policy within a week of taking office.
- 02
JFK had been pressing Israel to allow inspection of the Dimona reactor, in a fight his successor dropped.
- 03
JFK and RFK had pushed to require the American Israel Public Affairs Committee to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, an effort his successor dropped.
- 04
JFK had refused offensive weapons to Israel, sending limited defensive armaments and humanitarian aid. LBJ reversed this too, moving tanks, artillery, and fighter aircraft, courtesy of the new and growing military industrial complex.
- 05
JFK supported Resolution 194 and the Palestinian right of return. LBJ’s administration backed Resolution 242, which foreclosed it.7 8
What is not in dispute is the sequence. The man who said Vietnam was not worth another American life was dead within a day, and the policy he had set was dead within five. The men who drafted the replacement had been arguing for that war since 1961. The record of what they wanted is in the archives. The record of what happened to the president is in the Warren Report. The two records are not the same record, and this page does not claim they are.
RFK and Martin Luther King Jr. both took strong public positions against the war and were both killed within two months of each other in 1968. Draw from that what the evidence supports and no more.
The limits of the record
These documents establish what was proposed, what was signed, when, and by whom. They do not establish who killed the president or why. Readers who want to go further should start with the FRUS volume and the Bundy files, and should be suspicious of anyone who tells them the paperwork settles it.
One further limit, from the same volume. The footnote does not date Bundy’s draft November 21. The signed memorandum does not say the United States will “carry the war north.” Paragraph 2 restates the October 2 withdrawal objective. Paragraph 7 is printed above, in the words Bundy signed.
Exhibits
TODO: embed the scan of NSAM 263, first page, October 11, 1963. Do not invent a URL.
TODO: embed the draft NSAM 273 from the Kennedy Library National Security Files. The FRUS footnote does not date it November 21.
TODO: embed audio or video of Walt Rostow on the commission. No URL invented.
TODO: embed the Riverside Church address, April 4, 1967.
TODO: embed the relevant passage of JFK (1991). Describe only which institutions the scene names.
TODO: embed the Green Book chart, Table 6-8, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2000.
TODO: embed page 17 of The Samson Option, the kitchen-cabinet passage. Quote the book. Do not add a caption the book does not print.
TODO: embed the Gleysteen quotation in its 1997 source, once the page and the recording are confirmed.
Sources
A reading list. Not an endorsement of every conclusion a reader may draw from it.
- National Security Action Memorandum No. 263, Washington, October 11, 1963. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963, Document 194. history.state.gov. Return
- National Security Action Memorandum No. 273, Washington, November 26, 1963, with the editorial note on Bundy’s draft and paragraph 7. Same volume, Document 331. history.state.gov. Return
- The White House statement of October 2, 1963, cited in paragraph 2 of NSAM 273. The FRUS footnote points to Document 170 of the same volume. history.state.gov. Return
- U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2000 (Green Book), Table 6-8, budget authority by fiscal year, current dollars. The figures in the text are the ones printed on that table for FY1963, FY1965, FY1966, FY1968, and FY1975. Return
- Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, Costs of War, “Estimate of U.S. Post-9/11 War Spending,” FY2001–FY2022, including future veterans’ care, stated total about $8 trillion. watson.brown.edu/costsofwar. Return
- Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), the account of the October 8, 1973 meeting in Golda Meir’s office. Return
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), December 11, 1948, paragraph 11, on the return of refugees. un.org. Return
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967. UN Digital Library. Return






























